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Disease dynamics and costly punishment can
foster socially imposed monogamy
Chris T. Bauch1 & Richard McElreath2
Socially imposed monogamy in humans is an evolutionary puzzle because it requires
costly punishment by those who impose the norm. Moreover, most societies were—and
are—polygynous; yet many larger human societies transitioned from polygyny to socially
imposed monogamy beginning with the advent of agriculture and larger residential groups.
We use a simulation model to explore how interactions between group size, sexually
transmitted infection (STI) dynamics and social norms can explain the timing and emergence
of socially imposed monogamy. Polygyny dominates when groups are too small to sustain
STIs. However, in larger groups, STIs become endemic (especially in concurrent polygynist
networks) and have an impact on fertility, thereby mediating multilevel selection. Punishment
of polygynists improves monogamist fitness within groups by reducing their STI exposure,
and between groups by enabling punishing monogamist groups to outcompete polygynists.
This suggests pathways for the emergence of socially imposed monogamy, and enriches our
understanding of costly punishment evolution.
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T
he majority of historically known human societies have
allowed, and still allow, polygynous mating1,2. Yet, in some
of the most successful agricultural societies, polygyny was
gradually replaced by socially imposed monogamy, beginning
with the transition from hunter–gatherers to agriculturalists
and the resulting larger residential groups3,4. Subsequently,
a disproportionate amount of the world’s population growth in
recent millennia has been driven by a relatively small number of
societies, many of which practice socially imposed monogamy5.
Social monogamy characterizes many animal species, and the
role of factors such as infanticide and the spatial distribution of
females has been explored in the literature6,7. However, the social
imposition of monogamy via injunctive social norms appears to
be particular to humans. This phenomenon is puzzling in two
ways. First, from an evolutionary perspective, polygynous males
can more readily translate increasing wealth into increasing
reproductive success. Therefore, it is unclear why patriarchal
societies would voluntarily limit numbers of wives. Second,
socially imposed monogamy requires costly punishment by those
who impose the norm8,9. Costly punishment can accrue
advantages to the punisher (that is, those who pay a cost to
impose a penalty on others exhibiting a certain behaviour) if used
to enforce cooperation, for example. However, costly punishment
is susceptible to ‘second-order free-riding’, whereby non-
punishers can reap the benefits created by punishers, without
having to pay the costs of punishing10. The origin of socially
imposed monogamy represents an important knowledge gap
because sexual behaviour is highly regulated in many human
societies11.
Previous hypotheses for the transition from polygyny to
socially imposed monogamy have invoked female choice, male
power dynamics, technological impacts, cultural group selection
and pathogen stress12–18. Any of these may be part of the answer.
Moreover, human behaviours are complex phenomena often
determined by multiple mechanisms. Therefore, we speculate that
multiple mechanisms supported the emergence of socially
imposed monogamy. However, hypotheses stressing individual
benefits face the obstacle of explaining costly social imposition,
and hypotheses that stress group benefits must overcome
individual incentives against costly punishment. The timing of
the emergence of socially imposed monogamy—with the advent
of agriculture and larger resident populations—also requires
explanation.
We hypothesize that bacterial sexually transmitted infections
(STIs) fostered the emergence of socially imposed monogamy, by
making costly punishment of non-monogamists advantageous to
punishers at individual and group levels of selection. STIs can
impose enormous selective pressures on humans19–21. In the
absence of modern interventions such as antibiotics, latex
condoms or contact tracing, bacterial STIs such as syphilis,
chlamydia and gonorrhea can cause very high rates of infertility
and thus major demographic impacts19,20,22–24. Therefore, we
speculate that STI-imposed selective pressures on our ancestors
could have been even larger.
Under certain conditions, populations with overlapping sexual
partnerships, or ‘concurrency’, exhibit higher STI prevalence than
populations of serial monogamists (who only have one partner at
a time), even when the total number of partnerships is the
same25–28. In regions dominated by small and scattered
residential groups, a newly introduced STI is more likely to go
extinct due to stochastic fadeout29; hence, concurrency may not
disadvantage polygyny. However, in regions where technologies
such as agriculture have facilitated higher population densities
and greater connectivity between groups, STIs can more easily
become endemic. In this regime, we hypothesize that polygyny
becomes disadvantageous relative to monogamy because of
concurrency. Thus, under certain epidemiological conditions,
monogamy may outperform polygyny under within-group
competition. In addition, groups with individuals who enforce
monogamous social norms and thus maintain low within-group
STI prevalence may outcompete polygynous groups, who suffer
reduced population size from STI health burdens. Such
interaction between group size, disease dynamics and social
norms may have contributed to the association of monogamy
with large, integrated agricultural societies.
We emphasize that our hypothesis concerns mating, not
marriage per se. Some societies, such as the ancient Romans,
imposed monogamous marriage but permitted extramarital
sexual relations in brothels, so long as moderation was
exercised30. On the other hand, some partible paternal societies
in South America encourage extramarital polyandrous mating31.
Hence, although marriage and mating are closely related, there is
not always one-to-one correspondence.
These examples illustrate the enormous variability in sexual
norms11, which should be expected if norms are complex
phenomena determined by multiple mechanisms. It is therefore
improbable that any single hypothesis could explain the entire
range of observed behaviours. However, despite this variability,
our hypothesis is testable because it concerns an overall trend in
behaviour. In populations where our hypothesized mechanism is
in operation, we should observe (when controlling for other
variables) that the prevalence of polygyny declines with increasing
group size on account of polygynists experiencing a higher
bacterial STI prevalence that puts them at a fertility disadvantage.
Testing this hypothesis would require data on bacterial STI
prevalence in hunter–gatherer and agriculturalist groups before
the advent of modern medicine. Such data appear to be scant or
non-existent. In the standard cross-cultural sample from
Murdock and White’s ethnographic atlas1, we find that the
proportion of polygynous groups decreases with group size
(Po10 3, r¼  0.67, weighted linear least-squares regression;
Supplementary Table 1 and Supplementary Fig. 1). In addition,
the frequency distribution of group sizes of polygynous groups is
smaller on average, and significantly different, than the frequency
distribution of group sizes of monogamous groups (P¼ 0.0073
Student’s t-test; P¼ 0.089 two-sample Kolmogorov–Smirnov
test). However, the standard cross-cultural sample does not
contain data on bacterial STIs. Moreover, this preliminary
analysis does not control for confounding variables such as
modern disease interventions, cultural phylogeny and other
factors that may influence the relationship between polygyny and
group size.
An empirical test of the hypothesis is desirable despite these
challenges. However, our objective was to validate the basic logic
of the hypothesis. This is imperative since the hypothesis invokes
complex nonlinear interactions between natural and social
dynamics. We present an empirically grounded simulation model
based on known demographic parameters of hunter–gatherers
and agriculturalists, and established transmissibility and natural
history profiles of bacterial STIs. We use the model to investigate
the dynamics of sexual norm evolution in small and large
residential groups, showing that differential bacterial STI disease
burden in polygynists versus monogamists can robustly support
the evolution of socially imposed monogamy in larger residential
groups, at empirically realistic model parameter values.
Results
Baseline small and large group scenarios. We developed an
empirically driven agent-based model that captures interactions
between social dynamics and disease dynamics8,26,32. Full details
appear in the Methods section. Parameter values reflect bacterial
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STI epidemiology and the known demographics of
hunter–gatherers and agriculturalists33–51 (Table 1). We chose
bacterial STIs such as gonorrhea, syphilis and chlamydia as our
baseline since they have been present in human populations
for a relatively long time52. Males can play the strategies
P (polygynous), M (serial monogamist, non-punisher) or
X (serial monogamist, punisher). Single females look for mates
with a fixed probability per timestep, sorting available males by an
ideal free distribution based on fitness, defined as the current
lifetime number of offspring. A proportion of single females
practice exogamy, seeking partners outside of their birth group.
With a given probability per timestep, a pair can break up, an
individual can die or a pair can give birth. Males must help
provision the offspring of all of their female partners; hence, the
birth probability per pair depends on the number of female
partners of the male, although the value of the provisioning
parameter was set conservatively to favour polygynists (Table 1).
A newly recruited male adopts a strategy through social learning:
he randomly selects another male in the group and adopts his
strategy if that male has a higher fitness than the group
average53,54. However, a small proportion of males choose a
strategy randomly.
As a result of the way partnership dynamics are defined, the
sexual interactions in the population can be characterized as a
sexual partnership network25,41,55. The network is highly
fragmented, consisting of a collection of isolated, slowly
evolving pair components and—in the case of polygynous
groups—higher-order components with a star topology (triples,
quadruples, and so on). The network has a low node degree since
partnerships are relatively long lasting, with polygynists typically
only having r3 partners at a time (r1 for monogamists) and
females only having r1 partners. The network has a clustering
coefficient of zero, since it is heterosexual, and polygynous groups
exhibit a high degree of concurrency28,55–58.
At regular time intervals, each individual has a small
probability of becoming an index case of a new STI outbreak.
Infection spreads from an infected person to a susceptible partner
with a certain probability per timestep. A certain proportion of
infected persons are rendered infertile, and infected persons die
from disease with a certain probability per timestep. The infection
has a probability of being cleared in each timestep as well, after
which the individual is fully susceptible again. In each timestep,
each punishing monogamist pays a fixed cost to incur a penalty
on each polygynist in his group (hence, the costs paid/imposed
for each individual depend on the frequencies of polygynists/
punishing monogamists in the group). Costs and penalties are
expressed as a reduced birth rate.
Both the number of groups in the metapopulation and the
number of individuals in each group are constrained by their
respective carrying capacities. In each timestep, there is a certain
probability of two randomly chosen groups competing, with the
winner depending partly on group size. Vanquished groups are
removed, and half of the victorious group takes over their niche.
Initially, all individuals practice polygyny except for a small
number of punishing and non-punishing monogamists.
For the large group scenario, the model predicts a population
average STI prevalence of 2.9% (Table 2), which is comparable to
reported prevalences of gonorrhea, chlamydia and syphilis in the
World Health Organization (WHO) African Region47 (1.7–4.5%
depending on STI and gender).
In the hunter–gatherer scenario where group sizes are small
(group carrying capacity¼ 30) and there is no group competition,
we find that disease introductions cause short-lived outbreaks
that impose a transient burden on polygynists. However,
small group sizes ensure that stochasticity soon disrupts STI
transmission, and the STI fades out. The remaining polygynists
resurge in a disease-free environment (Fig. 1a). Hence,
polygynists almost always dominate within groups because of
their fertility advantage. Occasionally, monogamists or punishing
monogamists can transiently dominate a group, but polygyny is
eventually restored (Fig. 1b). At the metapopulation level, most
groups are polygynist-dominated, although a few monogamist
groups persist (Fig. 2a). Adding group competition simply
reinforces this effect, consolidating the domination of polygynists,
while also reducing infection prevalence by causing smaller
average group sizes (Fig. 2b). While polygynists experience higher
average STI prevalence than monogamists, it is negligible overall
(Table 2).
In contrast, in the agriculturalist scenario where group sizes are
larger (group carrying capacity¼ 300), the STI becomes endemic
Table 1 | Model parameters, baseline values, intervals for probabilistic sensitivity analysis and literature sources.
Parameter Description Baseline value and PSA intervals Source
r Probability of seeking partner per unit time 0.1 per month (33)
e Probability of practicing exogamy 0.8 (0.6, 1.0) (34)
o Probability of pair breakup per unit time 0.05 per year (0.04, 0.06) (35)
d Probability of non-STI related death per unit time 0.01429 per year (36)
b Mean birth probability per unit time 0.079 per year (37)
s Scale parameter controlling standard deviation of lognormal birth probability 0.29 (0.23, 0.35) (37)
w Mate selection exponent 1.5 (1.2, 1.8) (38) (calibrated)
f Provisioning factor 0.3 (0.2, 0.4) (37, 39)
s Fraction of recruits picking strategy randomly 0.01 Assumption
D Time between disease re-introductions 70 years (40, 100) Assumption
p Probability of being an index case 0.01 Assumption
t Probability of STI transmission in a pair per unit time 0.85 per month (0.8, 0.9) (40–43, 51)
l Probability of clearing infection 1.0 per year (0.8, 1.2) (44–47, 49)
y Probability that infection sterilizes or causes pregnancy loss 0.05 (0.04, 0.06) (24, 48, 50)
c Cost of punishing cost of being punished 0.01 (0.005, 0.015) Assumption
Nmax Maximum number of groups 50 Assumption
K Group carrying capacity Small group: 30
Large group: 300
(37)
k Probability of group competition per unit time No comp: 0 per month
Comp: 0.05 per month (0.03, 0.07)
Assumption
g Factor determining importance of group size in competition events 10 (5, 15) Assumption
PSA, Probabilistic Sensitivity Analysis; STI, sexually transmitted infection.
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in polygynist groups, causing group depopulation (Fig. 1c).
Punishing monogamists invade the group by taking advantage of
windows of opportunity when polygynists have been reduced to
such small numbers that monogamists do not need to expend
significant resources in punishing (Fig. 1d). The growing number
of punishing monogamists further suppresses polygyny in a
positive feedback loop, leading to eventual domination of the
group by punishing monogamists (Fig. 1c,d). Sometimes,
non-punishing monogamists are able to invade and dominate a
group, and they tolerate a higher prevalence of polygynists in
their group than punishers would (Fig. 1e). However, at the
metapopulation level, the endemic STI enables punishing
monogamists to dominate most groups, while monogamists
persist at intermediate frequencies and purely polygynist groups
are strongly suppressed (Fig. 2c). Group competition reinforces
the dominance of punishing monogamists at the expense of
non-punishing monogamists (Fig. 2d). As a result, infection
prevalence decreases still further, compared with the scenario
without group competition (Fig. 2d versus 2c).
A metapopulation consisting entirely of non-punishing
monogamist groups can always be invaded by polygynists, who
take advantage of low disease prevalence and lack of punishment
(Fig. 2e). The result is a mixed metapopulation comprising
mostly non-punishing monogamist groups, with a significant
minority of polygynist groups. However, this state is short
lived since punishing monogamist groups can subsequently
invade (Fig. 2e). Hence, a purely non-punishing monogamous
population cannot outcompete a mixed population of punishing
and non-punishing monogamist groups.
Individual polygynists suffer higher STI prevalence than
non-polygynists in their group, and polygynist groups suffer
higher STI prevalence than non-polygynist groups (Table 2). This
applies significant within-group and between-group selection
against polygyny in the large group scenario. STI pressure
ensures that polygynist groups remain smaller than punishing
monogamist groups over the long term (Table 2). The size
discrepancy between polygynist and monogamist groups favours
monogamists under group competition.
Probabilistic sensitivity analysis. These results are confirmed by
a probabilistic sensitivity analysis, which evaluated the sensitivity
of our results to simultaneous changes in multiple parameter
values away from their baseline values. Triangular distributions
were defined around the baseline parameter values (Table 1).
We conducted 2,000 simulation runs, each lasting 30,000 years of
simulated time. For each simulation run, parameter values were
sampled from each of the triangular distributions described in
Table 1. We found that punishing monogamist groups dominated
the metapopulation in 59% of cases (that is, there were more
punishing monogamist groups than either of the other two types
by the end of the simulated time period), whereas non-punishing
monogamist groups dominated in 13% of cases and polygynist
groups dominated in 28% of cases.
Univariate sensitivity analysis. These results are also confirmed
by univariate sensitivity analysis on 14 model parameters
(Supplementary Figs 2–15). The proportion of groups in the
metapopulation; average group size; average individual fitness;
and average prevalence (all stratified by strategy) were plotted as
each of the 14 parameters was varied across a range one at a time,
while the other parameters remained at their baseline values. Fifty
realizations were conducted at each of the 10 tested parameter
values across a given range.
The univariate sensitivity analysis also showed that the model
outcomes are most sensitive to the frequency of group
competition, the duration of infection and the proportion of
total offspring provisioning provided by males.
Excessive group competition suppresses all groups and
depopulates the entire metapopulation, while insufficient group
competition removes the group-level benefits of socially imposed
monogamy, although the within-group benefits are still sufficient
to sustain monogamy and socially imposed monogamy as the
primary strategies (Supplementary Fig. 8). A sufficiently long
duration of infection imposes a heavy burden on the metapopu-
lation, significantly suppressing or eliminating all groups, while a
very short duration of infection reduces infection prevalence to
such low levels that polygyny is no longer disadvantaged relative
to monogamy (Supplementary Fig. 14). However, the resulting
infection prevalence is unrealistically low compared with what is
observed in real populations47. Finally, if males do not need to
provision their offspring very much (such that females provide
the great majority of resources), then polygyny confers sufficient
fitness benefit to enable it to resist invasion by monogamists,
although the parameter values at which this occurs correspond to
unrealistically low levels of male provisioning (Supplementary
Fig. 9).
Quorum sensing and STI-induced mortality scenarios. We
conducted additional univariate sensitivity analyses for scenarios
where punishing monogamists do not apply punishment until
their frequency in the group exceeds a certain threshold (quorum
sensing; Supplementary Fig. 15) and where the STI causes
mortality (Supplementary Fig. 3). Results are not sensitive to the
quorum-sensing scenario, since increasing thresholds only further
strengthens domination by punishing monogamists. Results are
sensitive to sufficiently large STI mortality rates; however, the
required mortality rate (10% probability of dying in the first year)
is unrealistically high for bacterial STIs such as gonorrhea and
chlamdyia, and in the case of syphilis, death does not occur until
later stages48.
Coital dilution scenario. In populations with concurrent
partnerships, coital frequencies may be reduced in pairs where
one of the individuals has other partners (‘coital dilution’)57–59.
Hence, we explored a scenario where polygynists have a reduced
transmission rate because of coital dilution. We find that
Table 2 | STI prevalence and group size by strategy*.
Small group scenario Large group scenario
Within X groups Within M groups Within P groups Across all groups Within X groups Within M groups Within P groups Across all groups
STI prevalence
All individuals 0.003 (±0.003) 0.002 (±0.003) 0.004 (±0.0003) 0.004 (±0.0003) 0.014 (±0.035) 0.038 (±0.024) 0.181 (±0.042) 0.029 (±0.018)
X individuals 0.002 (±0.002) 0.001 (±0.004) 0.001 (±0.001) 0.001 (±0.001) 0.01 (±0.014) 0.017 (±0.01) 0.075 (±0.024) 0.013 (±0.007)
M individuals 0.002 (±0.009) 0.001 (±0.002) 0.001 (±0.001) 0.001 (±0.001) 0.008 (±0.001) 0.024 (±0.012) 0.083 (±0.02) 0.019 (±0.007)
P individuals 0.009 (±0.016) 0.007 (±0.012) 0.004 (±0.0003) 0.004 (±0.0003) 0.082 (±0.088) 0.171 (±0.036) 0.228 (±0.063) 0.129 (±0.019)
Group size 21.3 (±0.8) 21.5 (±0.7) 22.4 (±0.1) 22.3 (±0.1) 238.2 (±27.1) 231.1 (±21.9) 199.4 (±27.5) 222.4 (±27.3)
STI, sexually transmitted infection.
*Long-term average group size and STI prevalence by strategy type, in monogamist (X), non-punishing monogamist (M) and polygynists (P) groups and across the whole population, for the small group
and large group scenarios. Values are the average across 100 simulation runs over 30,000 years each, and parenthetical values denote one s.d.
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realistic parameter ranges for coital dilution do not change our
predictions, and punishing monogamists are still able to
invade because of greater STI-imposed burden on polygynists
(Supplementary Fig. 16 and Supplementary Methods).
Chronic infection scenario. We also explored a scenario for a
chronic infection with a low transmission rate, such as HIV. We
choose parameters based on HIV infection for the infertility rate
y¼ 0.5 (ref. 21), transmission probability t¼ 0.04 per month
(ref. 60), and disease-induced death probability m¼ 0.1 per year
(ref. 61; Supplementary Methods). At baseline parameter
values, the results are similar to the bacterial STI scenario
(Supplementary Table 2). Under the probabilistic sensitivity
analysis, punishing monogamist groups dominated the metapo-
pulation 71% of the time, monogamists dominated 25% of the
time and polygynist groups dominated only 4% of the time.
However, the results for the chronic infection scenario are much
more sensitive to coital dilution at empirically realistic levels of
coital dilution (Supplementary Fig. 17 and Supplementary
Methods). This confirms the intuition that network con-
currency should be more important for infectious diseases with
high transmission rate and short duration of infection than for
diseases with low transmission rate and long duration of
infection56,62.
Discussion
Here we developed a simulation model based on known
demographic profiles of hunter–gatherers and agriculturalists
and bacterial STI epidemiology, and we used the model to show
how growing STI disease burden in larger residential group sizes
can foster the emergence of socially imposed monogamy in
human mating through processes of cultural evolution.
Our hypothesis is compatible with other hypotheses on the
emergence of socially imposed monogamy12–18. For example,
Within-group dynamics: small group scenario
STI fades out
Within-group dynamics: large group scenario
Monogamists fail to invade 
Punishing monogamists
eventually replace polygynists...
 ... By taking advantage of times 
when polygynists numbers are reduced 
due to STIs, 
Although non-punishing monogamists












































































































































































































Figure 1 | STIs become endemic when groups become large and thereby enable punishing monogamists to take over most groups. Panels show the
numbers of punishing monogamists X (blue), non-punishing monogamists M (purple), polygynists P (red) and infection prevalence (proportion infected;
black) for the small group scenario in two different groups (a,b) as well as for the large group scenario in a group over both a long time window (c) and a
shorter time window showing the transition period (d), as well as a different group exhibiting a less common outcome where monogamists dominate (e).
Group carrying capacity is 30 individuals for the small group scenario (a,b) and 300 individuals for the large group scenario (c–e).
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other effects of monogamy (such as increased paternal investment
and reduced crime rates and intrahousehold conflict) have been
hypothesized to boost the fitness of monogamous groups under
group competition15. Alternatively, the within-group inclusive
fitness benefits of monogamy may have provided an initial
impetus for monogamy to get started18, after which the group-
level and individual-level mechanisms we explore begin to
augment the advantages of socially imposed monogamy, as
residential group sizes increased. As noted in the Introduction,
multiple mechanisms may have been involved in the emergence
of socially imposed monogamy, since social norms are a complex
phenomenon.
We designed our model with conservative assumptions so that
it was more difficult for punishing monogamists to invade.
For instance, punishing monogamy had to be able to invade
only with the benefit of differential STI prevalence, although in
reality, multiple effects could have acted together to promote
monogamy12–18. In addition, we did not allow punishing
monogamists to engage in quorum sensing, although in reality,
punishing monogamists would be capable of quorum sensing.
Third, we assumed a conservative value for the provisioning
factor f such that males provided significantly less support to
offspring than females, although in reality this factor is
higher37,39. Finally, we assumed a simple strategy set where
individuals could adopt only (punishing or non-punishing)
monogamist or polygynist strategies. However, a larger strategy
set where individuals adopt a strategy n, where n is their
maximum number of partners, might make it easier for socially
imposed monogamy to invade by allowing for bridge strategies
between monogamy and unconstrained polygyny.
We made other simplifying assumptions that could have an




Metapopulation dynamics: small group scenario
...Especially with group competition 
Metapopulation dynamics: large group scenario
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... Especially with group competition 
Figure 2 | STIs become endemic when groups become large and cause the metapopulation to become dominated by punishing monogamist groups.
Panels show the metapopulation dynamics of the number of punishing monogamist X (blue), non-punishing monogamist M (purple), and polygynist P (red)
dominated groups, and metapopulation infection prevalence (proportion infected; black). Panels show the small group scenario without group competition
(a) and with group competition (b), as well as the large group scenario without group competition (c) and with group competition (d). Also shown are
metapopulation dynamics when the metapopulation is initially dominated entirely by monogamist groups, for the large group scenario with group
competition (e). Metapopulation carrying capacity is 50 groups for all scenarios.
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always adopt a single strategy of sorting mates by an ideal free
distribution, whereas future work could introduce a strategy set
for females. In addition, we note that mating and marriage are
distinct (although related) phenomena in humans, and our model
concerns norms for restraint in mating, not marriage per se.
Previous models of STI transmission and control have
distinguished between short-term casual partnerships and
long-term steady partnerships41. This previous work could form
a basis for future models that distinguish explicitly between
marriage and mating.
Moreover, there is little data on STI prevalence in hunter–
gatherer and agriculturalist populations before the advent of germ
theory and modern testing, treatment and prevention. Perhaps,
the earliest reliable reference to gonorrhea discusses ‘the perilous
infirmity of burning’ in the 1161 Acts of the (English)
Parliament52, although biblical references to what appears to be
gonorrhea also occur63. Syphilis existed for certain by the
Fifteenth century, although there is debate about whether its
origin was Colombian or pre-Colombian63,64. Future work could
attempt to overcome these challenges and undertake an empirical
test of our hypothesis. Because of the lack of data on STIs in
prehistoric hunter–gatherer populations, data from contemporary
populations could be used. Whether polygyny is a harmful or
beneficial cultural practice at various levels of health and well-
being is a topic of continuing interest in the literature65. Recent
research has evaluated the relationship between polygyny and
HIV prevalence in contemporary African populations. Different
analyses have come to different conclusions about whether
polygyny increases HIV prevalence28,55–57. One such analysis
found that HIV prevalence is strongly and positively associated
with extramarital sexual partners, but weakly and negatively
associated with being in a polygynous marriage56. This finding
underlines the need to distinguish between marriage and mating
in future work. However, the differing natural history of HIV
versus bacterial STIs has significant implications for the impact of
concurrency on STI prevalence56,62; therefore, it is difficult
to extrapolate convincingly from HIV-focused studies to our
research question. An empirical test of our hypothesis would
require carefully controlled comparisons that account for
confounding variables such as availability of prevention
methods (for example, latex condoms), testing and treatment
that were not available in hunter–gatherer populations, as well as
the effects of cultural phylogeny. Interventions such as latex
condoms could influence the dynamics of our model. However,
they are not directly relevant to our hypothesis, which concerns a
period of human prehistory and early history for which there is
little evidence of widespread condom use.
Related to the issue of marital institutions and the need to
distinguish between marriage and mating in future work is the
role of religion. Constraints on sexual behaviour are often closely
associated with religious beliefs and institutions. The injunctive
social norms we explore here are naturally operationalized and
institutionalized as religiously decreed constraints on polygyny, as
occur in Christianity for instance. Future work could explicitly
include the role of religion in a way similar to how marital
institutions could be included.
Finally, the sexual network aspect of the model could be further
explored in future work, and related to existing work on network
theory and STI transmission through sexual networks. Analytical
methods such as percolation theory66 or pair approximation25,67
may yield closed-form analytical expressions describing
conditions for the emergence of socially imposed monogamy
on sexual partnership networks, although stochasticity
complicates the analysis. Previous modelling approaches that
investigate STI transmission and control have used everything
from deterministic ordinary differential equation models
without29 durable partnerships, to deterministic ordinary
differential equation models with partnerships of a specified
duration that can25 or cannot68 account for overlapping
partnerships, to agent-based sexual network models with
completely specific sexual partnership networks26,28,41,55,69.
Approaches using fully specified agent-based network models
have explored interventions for the control of chlamydia41,42,69,70
and gonorrhoea41; the role of concurrency in the spread of
HIV26,28,55; the impact of network heterogeneities on STI
transmission67; and the use of network models (and also
compartmental models) to estimate important epidemiological
parameters such as transmission rates51,67. In our model, females
only mate with one male and therefore the total number of
partnerships is the same, on average, between polygynist groups
and monogamist groups. Therefore, our model is most similar to
previous models that explore the effect of concurrency on HIV
transmission by changing concurrency without altering the
overall number of partnerships25,26.
In summary, our model illustrates a potential pathway that
might help explain the emergence—and timing of emergence—of
socially imposed monogamy resulting from interactions between
residential group size, STI dynamics and their impact on fertility,
and the evolutionary dynamics of social norms. Our model
couples natural and social dynamics and therefore complements
approaches that explore costly punishment evolution using
models with fixed payoff matrices8. In our model, multilevel
selection is endogenously regulated by disease dynamics rather
than depending on fixed payoff matrices. Approaches that couple
natural and social dynamics can provide insights regarding not
only the emergence of socially imposed monogamy, but also other
social norms relating to human physical contact.
Methods
Software. We developed an event-driven, discrete-time agent-based simulation
model, coded in the C programming language (Supplementary Data File).
Strategies. Males can play the strategy P (polygynous), M (monogamous) or
X (monogamous punisher). M and X strategists will not accept more than one mate
at a time (serial monogamy is allowed), whereas P strategists do not limit how
many mates they can have at any point in time. Females only have one strategy
of seeking any available male and do not prefer P, M or X (in reality, females
will strategically sort according to an ideal free distribution; we address this in
sensitivity analysis). At any given time, individuals are either in a pair (with at least
one mate) or single (no mates).
Mate selection dynamics. Single females look for mates with probability r per
timestep, picking an available male (either a single M or X strategist, or any
P strategist) at random, who then becomes their mate. With probability e, a single
female looks for mates in other groups and move to that group if they find an
available mate (representing exogamy), and otherwise she looks for mates within
their own group. A partnership breaks up with probability o per timestep.
Vital dynamics. Individuals die because of non-STI-related causes at rate d per
timestep. Those whose mate has died become single and seek a new mate according
to the usual mate selection dynamics. Each pair has an offspring with probability
b per timestep, where b is sampled from a lognormal probability distribution.
The birth rate in a pair where the male has other mates is reduced by a factor
1/(1fþfN), where N is the number of mates of the male and f is called the
provisioning factor, representing what contribution the male makes to provision
the family. The offspring is female with a 50% chance, and male otherwise. Male
offspring adopt a strategy through a social learning process. They (1) randomly
select a male in the group, and (2) if the sampled male is receiving a higher payoff
than the average male payoff in the group, they adopt the sampled male’s strategy
with a probability L/(1þ L) where L is the incremental difference in payoff between
the sampled male and the average male in the group; if a strategy is not found, they
go back to step 1 and repeat until a strategy has been chosen. Hence, a newly
recruited individual is more likely to adopt a strategy if it is more prevalent, and if
it is more successful. There is a sampling error; therefore, some fraction s of new
recruits picks a strategy randomly. The payoff of an individual is their current
lifetime number of offspring. Once individuals have chosen a strategy, they do not
change it.
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STI emergence and spread. Every D timesteps, each individual has a probability
p of becoming the index case of a new outbreak of a STI (hence, as the population
grows, the rate of emergence of new infections increases). The STI spreads from an
infected individual to a susceptible partner, with probability t per timestep.
Moreover, a proportion y of infected individuals do not have further offspring
because of infertility or stigma. Individuals clear the infection and become sus-
ceptible again, with a probability l per unit time. We neglect vertical transmission.
Punishment. In every timestep, each X strategist in a group pays a cost c to incur a
penalty c on each P strategist in the group. The cost and penalty of punishment are
measured in reduced birth rate, such that the birth probability b of a pair involving
an X strategist is multiplied by a factor (1 cP), and the birth probability of a pair
involving a P strategist is multiplied by a factor (1 cX). We constrain birth
probabilities to be non-negative.
Group dynamics. Each group initially consists of n̂=2 males and n̂=2 females.
At t¼ 0, all individuals are initially single, and seek out mates according to the
usual mate selection process. Overall, 96% of males are initially assigned to be
P strategists, 2% are X strategists and 2% are M strategists. There is a maximum
number of possible groups Nmax, and the number of groups starts out at Nmax but
may drop below that because of mortality. Group size is variable, being a function
of births and deaths; however, each group has a carrying capacity K, and no further
births are possible in a group that has reached size K. The initial population size is
n̂  K for all groups. When a group’s size reaches size 0.9 K, the group divides into
two groups as long as there is an available space for a daughter group to be formed
(that is, as long as NoNmax). Each male is assigned to the daughter group with a
50% probability, and otherwise stays in the mother group. Existing pairs are
conserved so that females move with their mates to the new group, if applicable.
Any remaining single females remain in the mother group.
A group selection mechanism is also applied. In each timestep, with probability
k, two randomly selected groups compete. The probability that group A is




ABð Þ, where nA and nB are their respective
group sizes. The factor g controls the extent to which factors besides group size
determine the victorious group. The vanquished group and all of its members are
removed completely and half of the males of the victorious group take over the spot
of the vanquished group, along with their mates.
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